Xi Jinping's idea of Shared Destiny within China is based on the requirement of 'unity of thought' 统一思想, especially in relation to social and political problems that may threaten stability. In promoting the rule of law, he seeks to create a strong underlying judicial and legal framework that will encourage public trust in the legal system and enhance the efficacy of the current political structure. Rebuilding the credibility of politico-legal institutions is a declared objective of reforms across the justice spectrum. The party leadership has demanded that all of China's courts, prosecution, police, national security and para-policing agencies work together towards this goal, which aims not just to ensure public security (and the security of the Party) but also to create a stable environment in which the Party can carry out its ambitious economic reform agenda.
Party-inspired 'unity of thought' is by definition largely intolerant of pluralism and dissent. This can make for a seemingly uneasy relationship with rule of law thinking: at the same time that Chinese leaders are seeking to strengthen judicial institutions to inspire popular trust in the process of law, they are cracking down on public expressions of dissent, including those that some would argue fall within the legal or constitutional rights of Chinese citizens. In late 2013, for example, the government criminalised the online spreading of rumours by including such behaviour within the definition of the crime of defamation. Arresting independently-minded public intellectuals and pro-human rights lawyers such as courage disunity in thought and practice over this sensitive period.
The Handle of the Dagger
Xi Jinping requires unity in practice as well as thought within the nation's justice and security agencies. As noted above, from late 2012, Xi's leadership has downplayed the 'Stability Maintenance' strategy of Hu Jintao. In late 2013 and in 2014, the Party moved to strengthen its central oversight of the administration of law and justice.
The party leadership was aware that it had to win back the hearts and minds of people whose trust in the law had been seriously eroded by political and judicial corruption, and who had become more inclined to seek justice through collective protests and petitions than through the legal system. 'Unity of thinking' on law and justice thus seeks to shift public understanding of the locale of justice from the streets back to officially regulated spaces within the legal system. Jiemin, but also Li Chuncheng 李春城, the former deputy party secretary of Sichuan, and Li Dongsheng 李东生, a former deputy public security minister.
They then began detaining members of his family, including his son Zhou Bin 周斌 and his daughter-in-law Huang Wan 黄婉. Finally, in July 2014, state media formally announced that Zhou himself was being investigated for corruption. Several state media editorials promised that Zhou was far from the last tiger in the campaign's sights. 
Recentralising the Nexus of Law and Politics
Xi's push for the rule of law had begun to gather pace from mid-2013 on- They list important justice reforms such as shifting responsibility for resourcing courts from the local to the provincial level. This move makes it much harder for local political authorities to threaten local judges and courts with withdrawing revenue in order to obtain favourable outcomes in administrative and civil disputes with local residents. The SPC intends to limit judicial discretion and inconsistency -especially in administrative or civil disputes that touch on social stability concerns -while enhancing transparency, including by posting judgments on court websites.
Reform documents strongly encourage courts to 'unify' 统一 their decision-making. To this end, the SPC has stepped up its case guidance system, promoting a number of model cases that illustrate best practice.
These models enable local courts to 'standardise' 规范化 disparate and uneven decision-making to achieve greater consistency in adjudicating and sentencing. This will make it possible to declare with confidence that 'similar judgments are made in similar cases' 同案同判 across the nation: unity of thinking and action within the justice system.
Enhancing Judicial Accountability
The SPC employs a number of high-profile reformist judges, including its President, Zhou Qiang 周强, and Deputy President, Shen Deyong 沈德咏, 
Abolishing Re-education Through Labour
The international media have highlighted the decision announced by the Third Plenum to abolish the system of Re-education Through Labour (RTL劳动 教养), the use of administrative detention that has been employed for decades to allow police and other authorities to incarcerate people for up to four years for minor crimes without the inconvenience of going through a trial. Such crimes included petty theft, prostitution and the trafficking of illegal drugs, but also religious or political dissent: for example, attending the prayer meetings of a proscribed church group or speaking out on a subject the authorities deemed unacceptable.
According to the Resolution of the Plenum, an enhanced system of 'community corrections' would replace RTL. During the last ten years, the authorities in some jurisdictions have experimented with a system of 'community corrections' 社区 矫正 whereby offenders spend their sentence in community service. To date, it is still unclear how this mechanism will be used and what the procedural requirements for its application will be. The Ministry of Justice is Tang Hui 唐慧, from Yongzhou, Hunan province, was sentenced to one and a half years of labour re-education for demanding tougher punishment for those who allegedly raped and forced her daughter into prostitution. She was released eight days later following a huge public outcry Photo: backchina.com now working toward a final draft of a new Community Corrections Law to solve these uncertainties, standardise diverse practices of 'community correction' around the country and to regulate this expanded institution.
The reform of RTL has also generated debate about the legality of other forms of detention, including those replacing RTL. These include the 'custody and rehabilitation' 收容教养 of juveniles, prostitutes and those who procure their services; 'black jails' 黑监狱 for petitioners who have not been charged with a crime but whom the authorities deem inconvenient or offensive; 'criminal detention' 拘留 for pre-trial criminal suspects and 'residential surveillance' 监视居住. The last was originally an alternative to pre-trial detention but is now used as a form of extra-legal house arrest for activists, their close relatives (such as the imprisoned Nobel Peace Laureate Liu Xiaobo's 刘晓波 wife, Liu Xia 刘霞) and individuals accused of undermining stability. an editorial in the Beijing News 新京报, declaring in high dudgeon tones that the event 'proved that ruling the people is easy while ruling (local) officials is the difficult part'.
Conclusion
One constant that has been on display in the justice arena in China over the last three decades is the idea that broad national political discourses -Harmonious Society, Stability Maintenance and so on -set the context for how justice is dispensed. These political watchwords shape the way in which justice is conceptualised and practised. To this list, we can now add 'comprehensively advancing the rule of law', a recycled catchphrase from the Deng Xiaoping era but now with some additional 'Xi Jinping charac- Yet Xi's insistence on doing this 'the party way' places potentially irreconcilable, contradictory demands on the courts and other agents of justice. It will be difficult for them to deliver 'justice for the people' while 'unifying' with the centre. Indeed, the government's requirement that the judicial organs join the battle to 'unify thinking' places the credibility of the justice system in question even as it is ridding itself of some of its most questionable historic practices.
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